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Abstract
Over the years, many biometric template protection schemes, primarily based on the notion
of “cancelable biometrics” have been proposed. A cancelable biometric algorithm needs to
satisfy four biometric template protection criteria, i.e., irreversibility, revocability, unlinka-
bility, and performance preservation. However, a systematic analysis of irreversibility has
been often neglected. In this paper, the common distance correlation characteristic of can-
celable biometrics is analyzed. Next, a similarity-based attack is formulated to break the
irreversibility of cancelable biometric under the Kerckhoffs’s assumption, where the cance-
lable biometrics algorithm and parameter are known to the attackers. The irreversibility
based on the mutual information is also redefined, and a framework to measure the informa-
tion leakage from the distance correlation characteristic is proposed. The results achieved
on face, iris, and fingerprint prove that it is theoretically hard to meet full irreversibility. To
have a good biometric system, a balance has to be achieved between accuracy and security.
Keywords:
Cancelable biometrics, distance preservation, similarity-based attack, information leakage
quantification
1. Introduction
Due to the usability of identity management, biometric-based authentication systems
have been widely deployed. However, the large diffusion and wide deployment of biometrics
systems has led to concerns about the security and privacy of biometric data. For instance,
the disclosure of biometric data can cause exposure of sensitive personal information. In
addition, the compromised biometric data may not be revoked due to its permanent link with
the user’s identity. In recent years, many research efforts have been made to solve the above
issues i.e., template protection techniques (BTP) such as cancelable/revokable biometrics.
Cancelable biometrics (CB) is a parameterized, irreversible, and revokable transformation
to ensure security and privacy of the biometric template (see review papers [1, 2, 3, 4]).
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Figure 1: A typical cancelable biometric system consists of enroll and query module. The matcher matches
the query template with enrolled template to generate similarity score, then a decision is given based on the
system threshold.
If the transformed biometric template is compromised, a new template can be generated
for the same user by employing different transformation function parameters. A cancelable
biometric system generally consists of a feature extractor, a parameterized transformation
function, and a matcher to generate a matching score in the transformed domain (Fig. 1).
The parameterized transformation function can be realized by a non-invertible function or
by salting, and the parameters can be passwords or user-specific seeded (pseudo) random
numbers.
In 2011, three criteria for biometric template protection were identified in ISO24757 [5],
i.e., irreversibility, revocability, and unlinkability. Revocability requires the system to be able
to issue new protected templates to replace the compromised one. Unlinkability requires
the retrieval of any information by matching two protected templates from two different
applications to be computationally impossible. Irreversibility means that the retrieval of the
original biometric data from stored biometric templates to be computationally infeasible.
Specifically, in ISO24757, irreversibility is defined as “the property of a transform that creates
a biometric reference from a biometric sample(s) or features such that knowledge of the
transformed biometric reference cannot be utilized to determine any information about the
generating biometric sample(s) or features”.
The security of one BTP scheme is linked to the aforementioned criteria. For example,
in regard to unlinkability, if the attack can link several biometric templates from different
applications or databases, the identity associated with those templates is compromised. In
2017, Gomez et al. [6] proposed a framework to evaluate a given BTP scheme in terms
of unlinkability. However, the said framework lacks systematic analysis and evaluation in
terms of the irreversibility, which is the main focus of this paper. From the perspective of
irreversibility, if the attacker can reverse the biometric template easily, then the system is
likely to be compromised. In [7] a similarity-based attack, based on the genetic algorithm
under Kerckhoffs’s assumption, was proposed to reconstruct a preimage from a cancelable
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biometric template. The soundness of the similarity-based attack is attributed to the in-
formation leakage originated from the cancelable biometric template matching score. The
experimental results attest the vulnerability under this type of attack. More importantly,
the approximated features do not necessarily need to match with the original features under
attack. The research in [7] suggests that the irreversibility of cancelable biometrics based on
distance preserving can be easily compromised.
To better understand the extent to which one cancelable biometric scheme produces
templates which can not be reversed, the quantification of information leakage or privacy
leakage is required. The theoretical quantification of information leakage is an important
support to develop a secure template protection technology. However, there is still a big
gap between the quantification of information leakage and practical biometric applications.
The purpose of this paper is to address the similarity-based attack, which can break the
irreversibility of a cancelable biometric system based on the distance correlation property. A
general framework which can measure the information leakage from the distance correlation
on cancelable biometric is also proposed.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. The identification of the common distance preserving characteristic of cancelable bio-
metrics and its risks from similarity-based attacks under Kerckhoffs’s assumption,
where cancelable biometric algorithms and parameters are disclosed.
2. A framework to quantify the information leakage from the distance correlation.
3. Revisit the definition of irreversibility based on the mutual information.
4. In our experiment, 5 cancelable biometric schemes are considered, which are com-
monly utilized in 3 types of biometric modalities. The additional results prove that it
is theoretically hard to achieve full irreversibility. Therefore, a good compromise be-
tween matching accuracy and template security needs to be determined for any given
application.
2. Background
In this section, the distance preserving property of cancelable biometrics is firstly dis-
cussed. A brief review of cancelable biometrics including BioHashing [8], Index-of-Max
hashing [9], spectral hashing [10], Bloom-Filter [11] and two-factor protected minutiae cylin-
der code (2PMCC) [12] is also presented. Finally research articles related to irreversible
analysis are discussed.
2.1. Relative distance preserving property of cancelable biometrics
Most cancelable biometric schemes essentially follow the relative distance preserving pro-
jection notion (Fig. 2). BioHashing, Bloom-Filtering, and other algorithms project the
biometric feature onto another space while preserving the relative distance between two
points. As such, matching can be accomplished in the transformed domain. Generally, the
irreversibility of these algorithms is achieved by the specific projection technique. Given a
set X of biometric feature vectors and its transformed vectors set Y , a cancelable biometric
algorithm can be denoted as:
Y = F(X ;K), (1)
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Figure 2: A distance preserving projection from higher dimension to lower dimension. x1 and x2 are close
to each other while their projected data points y1 and y2 should also be close to each other in R2.
where F is a family of cancelable biometric transformation functions, and K is the parameter
of the transformation function.
For any two biometric feature vectors xi,xj ∈ X and its corresponding transformed
templates yi,yj ∈ Y , to achieve accurate matching in the transformed domain, the distance
between xi and xj should be nearly preserved in the new space, hence f(·) should satisfy:
‖d− ds‖< ,∃  > 0, (2)
where d = ‖xi − xj‖ is the distance of any two points in the input feature space, ds =
‖f(xi)− f(xj)‖= ‖yi − yj‖ is the distance in output transform space.
2.2. Review of cancelable biometrics
BioHashing , a generic salting-based two-factor cancelable biometric scheme [8], is based
on the user-specific token and a real-valued biometric feature vector. The user-specific token
is utilized to perform the salting, followed by a binarization step. Specifically, the n-bit
BioHash code c of a feature vector x ∈ RN is computed as c = Sgn(∑xbi − τ), where
Sgn(·) is the sign function, τ is an empirical threshold determined by the user, and bi ∈
RN , i = 1, ..., n(n ≤ N) is a random vector (correspond to the K in (1)). Since the hash
code is a binary string, the Hamming distance between two hash codes is computed as
the similarity metric of two biometric vectors. If the integrity of the biometric template is
compromised, the feature vector x can be replaced by a newly generated pseudo-random
vector.
Bloom Filters can be applied to generate a cancelable biometric template by mapping
the biometric data onto a bit array. In [11], Bloom Filters are applied to generate a cancelable
biometric template from an iris code. Specifically, the two-dimensional binary iris-code
feature with width W and height H is extracted first according to the method proposed by
Rathgeb et al. [11]. Next, the W ×H iris-codes are divided into K blocks with equal size,
and each column has ω bits where ω ≤ H. Then, for each block, all sequences of each column
are projected to the according to locations of the Bloom filter bit array, which associated
with that block with a size of 2ω. Finally, the template with a size of K × 2ω is generated
by collecting K different Bloom filters. To achieve unlinkability, an application-specific bit
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vector T ∈ {0, 1}w, which corresponds to the K in (1), is XORed with the codewords before
mapping to the Bloom Filters.
Index-of-Max (IoM) [9] is a ranking-based Locality Preserving Sensitive hashing tech-
nique, where a cancelable template is generated by collecting the max indexes generated by
repeated random projections. Unlike BioHashing, with IoM hashing, an integer-valued tem-
plate can be generated, which can also be easily converted into a binary vector. Specifically,
the product of feature vector x and the randomly generated Gaussian matrices W (K in
(1)) are computed, the index of the max value in the product is recorded as one hash code,
and finally a template of size m can be generated by repeating this process m times.
Non-linear multi-dimensional spectral hashing (NMDSH) [10], initially pro-
posed for face template protection, is an extension of graph-based Hamming embedding [13],
where the distance between feature vectors is compared with the Hamming distance between
the corresponding hash codes. First, the distance between vectors is computed as the affinity
matrix W , then the hashing problem is reduced to a binary matrix factorization of W . The
NMDSH algorithm is derived by adding a non-linearity to the original MSDH algorithm.
Specifically, the one-dimensional eigen functions φij(x(i)) and the corresponding eigen val-
ues λij are computed from the training data as shown in (1-2) in [10], where φij(x(i)) is the
j-th eigen function of the i-th coordinate, and λij is the corresponding eigenvalue. Next the
eigen values λij are sorted in ascending order, and the top k indices are selected to construct
the set A = {(i1, i1), (i2, i2), · · · , (ik, ik)}. Then, each data sample x from the test dataset is
encoded as yij(x) = sin(φij(x)) for all (i, j) ∈ A. A nonlinear softmod projection function is
defined as follow:
q(x) =
2
1 + e−8 sin(αpi x)
− 1, (3)
where α is the nonlinear rate to be determined empirically. The final output is computed
as y = q(φij(x)). The added non-linearity allows the elimination of the correlation between
the hash code and the original data. However, a high value of α, which produces a large
distortion of the projected data, may lead to poor matching performance. It is shown in [10]
that higher value of α means more distortion and non-linearity, which can lead to poor
matching accuracy.
Two-factor Protected Minutia Cylinder-Code (2PMCC) [12] is a template pro-
tection scheme based on Protected Minutia Cylinder-Code (PMCC) [14] and the Minutia
Cylinder-Code (MCC) [15] for fingerprints. The MCC is a kind of local descriptor for each
minutia, which encodes spatial and directional relationships between the minutia point and
its neighborhood of radius. In PMCC, to achieve non-invertibility, the Karhunen-Loe`ve
transform [16] is applied to project the feature vector extracted from each cylinder, followed
by a binarization step to generate the protected template. In [14], the authors claim that the
PMCC can preserve the cylinder distances in the transformed space although the original
information is not present in the protected template. However, as the template generated
from the PMCC algorithm can not be revoked, a revocable two-factor protection scheme,
namely 2PMCC, is proposed in [12]. The non-invertibility of 2PMCC depends on PMCC, a
secret s and a dimension reduction parameter k. The non-invertibility of PMCC has been
demonstrated under two different attacks [17], namely, directly attacking the original tem-
plate (type-I attack), and attacking a second template generated by different impressions
from the same finger (type-II attack).
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2.3. Review of irreversible analysis
In 2007, Ratha et al. proposed three transformations, i.e. Cartesian, polar, and func-
tional transformation on fingerprint minutiae features in [18, 19]. However, in [20], Quan et
al. argues that Ratha’s transformation function can be attacked by solving mathematical
equations or brute-force due to the weak many-to-one property.
In [21], a preimage attack for BioHashing based on genetic algorithm is proposed for
fingerprint. The main idea is to retrieve a feature vector whose template can be an approx-
imation of the original one. This is the first time genetic algorithm is utilized to attack a
cancelable biometric system. However, their analysis is still not sufficient. In [22], Lee et al.
proved that BioHashing is vulnerable to preimage attack based on pseudo-inverse matrix.
In 2014, Pagnin et al. [23] proved that information of the reference template can be
recovered when the matching process is performed using distance measures such as the
Hamming and the Euclidean distance. This information leakage enables a hill-climbing
attack, which given a sample that matches the template, it could lead to the full recovery of
the biometric template (i.e., centre search attack) even if it has been encrypted. However,
this work was performed on discrete data, and no quantitative analysis is provided.
In [24], Hattori et al. proposed a homomorphic encryption algorithm to achieve a secure
authentication on Iris by performing the matching process in the encrypted domain. In [25],
a spoofing attack is proposed against the proposed authentication scheme by finding a vector
that has the same distance with respect to (w.r.t) all binary vectors, and then the vector
is utilized to match with enrolled templates. However, this attack can only be applied to
binary features.
In [26, 27], a masquerade attack based on perceptron and neural-network learning is
presented in two scenarios, i.e., presence/absence hashing algorithm. In the first case, as-
suming the attacker can generate the matching score by accessing a set of binary templates
of various identities in the database, and the hashing algorithm is publicly released, the un-
known parameters (e.g., the random projection matrices and threshold in BioHashing) are
estimated first based on perceptron learning, and then the estimated parameters are utilized
to generate the features based on another perceptron learning. To synthesize the face image,
a hill-climbing attack is introduced to perform the reconstruction. In the second scenario,
assuming the hashing algorithm is kept secure against the attacker, and the attacker can
acquire a set of face images from different identities, the real-valued feature vectors are ex-
tracted by known feature extractor. Next, a three-layer MLP (one-hidden-layer) is trained
to model the process of hashing and matching, then a customized hill climbing is utilized to
construct the synthetic features. Standard hill climbing is utilized to reconstruct the face
images from the synthetic features.
In 2019, Chen et al. proposed a new biometric hashing, namely Deep Secure Quantization
(DSQ), to address the similarity-based attack issue [28]. In [28] the information leakage of
a cancelable biometric is quantified by the mutual information as I(d−; s−) where d− is the
normalized distance in the input feature space, s− is the normalized distance in the output
transform, and the symbol − indicates inter-class matching distance. To avoid the leakage,
the ideal cancelable biometric should satisfy I(d−; s−) ≤ δ, where δ is an up-bound constant.
To minimize the leakage, a hashnet with extra non-linearity based on a nonlinear “softmod”
activation function is proposed and added to a resnet. However, to evaluate the information
leakage, only inter-class matching distance is considered in [28]. In both intra/inter-class,
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Figure 3: The attacker can compromise one template in the database and estimate the preimage while the
preimage is unnecessarily identical to the original one. The preimage can be utilized to gain access to another
system by achieving f(xˆ) ≈ f(x).
distance can help an attacker to reconstruct the biometric feature vector. For example, based
on some searching algorithm such as hill-climbing, the attacker can still drive the evolution
toward optimal as long as the attacker can estimate the direction of the evolution. Besides,
the security analysis on similarity-based attack is lacking.
3. Attack based on the distance preserving property
The proposed similarity-based attack exploits the information leakage which is originated
from the distance correlation between the original biometric input feature space and the
transformed space. The basic idea of similarity-based attack is to generate the original
template approximately (preimage) based on an initial guess of template instance and the
objective function. Unlike conventional perception of reconstructing the exact features,
approximated features or preimage can generate a template close enough to the original
template, and hence can gain access to a given system (exceed the matching score threshold)
(See Fig. 3).
In similarity-based attack, Kerckhoffs’s assumption is adopted and we assume that the
attacker can access the protected template y = f(x) ∈ Y , and learn the transformation
function F as well as the parameters of the function. The final goal for the attack is to find
a feature that resembles the original one, which can be summarized in the following form:
xˆ∗ = arg min
xˆ
d(f(xˆ), f(x)), f ∈ F , (4)
where f(·) indicates an algorithm-specific distance preserving function and f(x) is the com-
promised template in the database. To find the best solution of (4), a genetic algorithm
(GA) is employed in the similarity-based attack. GA simulates the genetic mechanism of
the biology world, such as mutation, crossover, and selection. To find an optimal solution,
GA can drive the evolution of the solution population by repeatedly modifying individual
solutions, i.e., generate the children by selection, crossover, mutation manipulations. The
first population is initialized randomly in the defined solution space, then the aforementioned
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Figure 4: The diagram of GA evolution process flow. In this example the initial population has 5 individuals,
the value in the bracket is the decoded floating number of the feature, 4 individuals are selected according
to the rank of objective value, crossover is performed on the selected individuals, then followed by mutation
manipulation to generate next generation of population.
manipulations are utilized to generate the next generation. The objective function is utilized
to evaluate how optimal the individual in the population is (see Fig. 4). GA repeats this
process until objective value converges.
In reality it is highly possible that the attacker can gain more than one instance of the
cancelable templates, which may lead to more information leakage. Specifically, given n
compromised templates, the final goal of the attack can be formulated as:
xˆ∗ = arg min
xˆ
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(f(xˆ), f(xi)), (5)
where f(xi) indicates several instances of the compromised template from same identity for
i = 1, 2...n. Hence, we can formulate the objective function of GA as follows:
l =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(f(xˆ), f(xi)). (6)
As for the parameters of GA, we perform the selection by a stochastic uniform way. The
crossover fraction is set as 80%, and the mutation is performed by adding a random number
taken from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 to each entry of the parent vector. The
general process of the attack is shown in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 4.
To initiate the simulation of the attack, two system settings (Fig. 5) are defined as follows:
Compromised system (Sys C): A compromised biometric system which is protected
by a given cancelable biometric algorithm. We assume the worst case situation where all
users use the same parameter that has been stolen, for example, a compromised access control
system in Company A.
Target system (Sys T): An attack target biometric system under attack settings,
where the similarity-based attack is launched to find each user’s preimage xˆ from a trans-
formed template stored in the compromised system Sys C. Here, the attacker attempts to
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Algorithm 1: Similarity-based Attack based on GA
INPUT: Cancelable transform function f(·), compromised template f(x), objective
function l
OUTPUT: Approximated feature xˆ∗
Encoding the solution space, i.e. the space of xˆ, ;
Initiate iteration index of generation ` = 0, constraint tolerance δ, max generations ;
Evaluate initial individuals by objective function (6);
repeat
Selection of the best-fit individuals for next generation;
Generate new child by crossover and mutation operations;
Evaluate new individuals by objective function l ;
Replace the least-fit population with new individuals;
` = `+ 1;
until |l(`+ 1)− l(`)| < δ or ` > ;
Sys C
Sys T
𝑓𝑖 𝒙
Features                        Template                 Compromised
Approximation
Result                        Template DB              Reconstructed
𝑓𝑗 ෝ𝒙
x
ෝ𝒙
𝑑 = ||𝑓𝑗 ෝ𝒙 -𝑓𝑗 𝒙 ||
Figure 5: The flow of processes in the attack. The attacker compromises a template in the compromised
system (Sys C), and reconstructs the features based on this template. In target system (Sys T ), the attacker
tries to gain access with the reconstructed feature. The cancelable biometric function fi(·) and fj(·) can be
the same or different function, while the feature utilized should be generated from same extractor.
break into Sys T with xˆ. Note that the parameters of the cancelable biometric function are
usually different from Sys C. For example, an access control system in Bank B, where the
attacker tries to attack Bank B with the compromised template in Company A.
As discussed above, the core idea of similarity-based attack is to find the best solution for
(4). The general flow of the attack starts from compromising Sys C, and the reconstruction
9
process is carried out to find the best approximated feature to break through the target
Sys T . It is noteworthy that the cancelable transformation function fi(·) and fj(·) can be
the same function with different parameters (e.g., Biohashing with different parameter), and
they can also be different functions. The only requirement is that both systems use the
same feature extractor. Compared to the type-I and type-II attacks in [17], our attack is
entirely different as it is dedicated to cancelable biometric system, which involves revocability
and non-invertibility. We also consider the situation where different parameters have been
utilized for different users, making it a more realistic simulation.
Under similarity-based attack, Kerckhoffs’s assumption is the precondition of the attack,
which means that the parameters in SysC and SysT are assumed to be known by the
attacker. The similarity-based attack is invalid if parameter is securely kept.
4. Information leakage in the cancelable biometrics
In this section, we first discuss information leakage at the biometric feature level, and
then we relax the leakage quantifying problem on the distance-preservation level since the
attack is based on the distance-preservation property. We finally propose a quantifier based
on the Blahut–Arimoto algorithm.
4.1. Information leakage at feature level
In a cancelable biometric system, we denote random vector {x1, ...,xn} ∈ X to be the
original feature vector, and its corresponding protected template as {y1, ...,yn} ∈ Y . Here,
xi and yi can be a real-valued number or a single bit, but we will only consider binary
form for simplicity. It is worth to note that the proposed hypothesis can be applied to both
real and binary space. Generally by measuring the entropy, one can quantify the amount
of information in X (attacker’s initial uncertainty), the amount of information leaked to Y ,
and the amount of un-leaked information about X (attacker’s remaining uncertainty) [29].
Firstly, the entropy of X is defined as: H(X ) = −∑x∈X p(x) log p(x). The conditional
entropy which measures the uncertainty about X under the exposure of Y is defined as
H(X|Y) = −∑y∈Y p(y)∑x∈X p(x|y) log p(x|y), where H(X|Y) = 0 indicates X can be
completely retrieved from Y , while the maximum H(X|Y) = H(X ) indicates that X and Y
are totally independent.
The mutual information between X and Y , denoted as I(X ;Y), is another metric which
can evaluate the information learned from known Y . Given a cancelable biometric transfor-
mation f ∈ F , a protected template Y is generated by Y = f(X ), where X is the original
biometric feature vector. The mutual information can be computed as:
I(X ;Y) = H(X )−H(X|Y), (7)
where I(X ;Y) = I(Y ;X ), and 0 < I(X ;Y) < H(X ). Specifically, I(X ;Y) = 0 means that
X and Y are independent, while I(X ;Y) = H(X ) means totally dependent.
In reality, the attacker can possibly intercept several biometric template instances of the
same person, which means that the attacker may know multiple instances of Y . To answer
the question - “Will the multiple Y help the attacker gain more information about X ?”, we
first define the conditional mutual information:
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Definition 1. For random variables A, B and C, the conditional mutual information can
be computed as:
I(A;B|C) , H(A|C)−H(A|B,C). (8)
In this work, we consider a simple case where n = 2, i.e., two instances in Y are compromised,
to show that more compromised instances of template will cause higher risk.
Corollary 1. With (7) and (8), the mutual information I(X ;Y1,Y2) can be computed as
below:
I(X ;Y1,Y2) = H(X )−H(X|Y1,Y2)
= H(X )−H(X|Y1,Y2)−H(X|Y1) +H(X|Y1)
= [H(X )−H(X|Y1)] + [H(X|Y1)−H(X|Y1,Y2)]
= I(X ;Y1) + I(X ;Y2|Y1) ≥ I(X ;Y1).
(9)
Since I(X ;Y1,Y2) ≥ I(X ;Y1), we can conclude that more compromised Y lead to worse
situation of information leakage of X in favor of the attacker and our experiment result also
support this assertion. Based on the mutual information, the definition of irreversibility
given in the ISO/IEC IS 24745 for a cancelable biometric under single template exposure
can be reformulated as below:
Definition 2. Given a cancelable biometric transformation f ∈ F and feature vector X ,
a protected template Y is generated by Y = f(X ;K), where K is the parameter of f . If
I(X ;Y) = 0, f is fully irreversible, otherwise it is partial irreversible.
4.2. Information leakage at score level
The information leakage at feature level enjoys the theoretical soundness. However, it
is computationally hard to calculate the mutual information at feature level directly due to
the difficulty of estimating the entropy of continuous biometric features. Fortunately, upon
investigating the feature level leakage and the distance preservation property in (2), we found
that the distances among data points in the input feature space and output transform space
can be regarded as a relaxed form of the information leakage.
Suppose S be the distance scores of input feature space {s1, ..., si}, T be the distance
scores of output transform space {t1, ..., tj}, and s, t ∈ R. As discussed in [28], the in-
formation leakage at score level can be quantified via the mutual information between the
input feature distance and output transform distance, i.e., I(S;T ). It is noteworthy that
we consider both inter/intra-class matching distances instead of only inter-class distances in
[28].
In fact, I(S;T ) is only one part of the information leakage, where information can also
be leaked by other means. For example, one can retrieve the original feature x due to
the weakness of the projection operation, such as in [20], where the attacker can establish
equations to reconstruct the template. As discussed above, we can formulate the following
equation:
I(X ;Y) = I(S;T ) + Iother, (10)
where Iother is the information leakage from other means. Hence, the problem can be refor-
mulated as the information leakage at score level, i.e., the max value of I(S;T ).
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Table 1: Two examples: Probabilities of distance correlation for a perfect secure/insecure biometric system.
Feature space distance
Perfect secure example Insecure example
Transform
space
distance 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.8 0.2 0 0
0.4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.7 0.2 0
0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.6 0.4 0
0.6 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.7 0.1
The relaxation benefits are two-fold: 1) the similarity-based attack [7] is based on the
distance preservation notion, and 2) the mutual information at the feature level is com-
putationally hard, while the mutual information I(S;T ) can be easily computed since the
distances among data points are in the same domain, i.e., R.
With this idea in mind, (1) can be reformulated as:
T = F(S;K) = F(S;W ), (11)
where W is defined as the conditional probability of the input distance score given the
output distance score associated to the given system. Specifically, W can be formulated as
a transition probability matrix as follow:
W ={p(T = tj|S = si)} = {p(tj|si)}
=

p(1|1) p(2|1) · · · p(J |1)
p(1|2) p(2|2) · · · p(J |2)
...
...
...
p(1|I) p(2|I) · · · p(J |I)
 . (12)
To better understand the transition probability, two artificial examples are given in Ta-
ble 1. In Table 1, each cell gives the conditional probability of si resulting from tj. In the
perfect secure system example, each case of si and tj has equal probability. For example,
suppose the distance of two data points in the output transform space is 0.3, then the dis-
tance of two data points in the input feature space can be 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 with equal
probability, hence no information can be learned. However, the accuracy under such a sys-
tem will be deteriorated. In the insecure system example, when the distance of two data
points in the transform space is known to be 0.3, the distance in the input feature space
could be 0.1 with 80% probability, while 0.3 and 0.4 would be 0%. Hence, one can infer that
two data points in the input space can be close to each other. As expected, the system can
achieve good accuracy since the distance relationship is largely preserved in the transform
space.
4.3. Quantifying information leakage via the Blahut–Arimoto algorithm
The transformation function utilized in the cancelable biometrics can be regarded as a
channel, while the capacity of a channel represents how much information is preserved or
leaked in the transform space. Consider a cancelable biometric system and (11), given a
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transitional matrix W , let q = [q(i)|i = 1, ...,m] be the probability vector of the input
S where q(i) = p(si). The mutual information between the feature space distances and
transform space distances can be computed as:
I(S;T ) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
W (j|i)q(i) log W (i|j)
q(i)
, (13)
For a given cancelable biometric system with a fixed W (j|i), (13) is a convex function of the
input distribution q, hence there exists a maximum value which is defined as the maximum
leakage (ML) [30, 31]:
λmax ≡ max
q
I(S;T ). (14)
The Blahut–Arimoto algorithm [30, 31] is often utilized to compute the information
theoretic capacity of a channel numerically, in other words, how much information is passed
or leaked from S to T in our case. The core idea of the Blahut–Arimoto algorithm is to
find the optimal solution of the convex optimization problem by an iterative process over
q. First, the initial set of q0(i) for all i is chosen. Next, let Φ`(i/j) be a set of conditional
probabilities of input si when given output tj:
Φ`(i|j) = q
`(i)W (j|i)∑
k q
`(k)W (j|k) ,∀(i, j), (15)
where i = 1, 2, ..., I, j = 1, 2, ..., J , ` is the iteration index. Next, q`+1(i) is generated as:
q(`+1)(i) =
exp
∑
iW (j|i) ln Φ`(i|j)∑
k exp
∑
iW (j|i) ln Φ`(i|j)
. (16)
Define the relationship between mutual information I(S;T ) as J(q,Φ`(i|j)):
J(q,Φ) =
∑
i
∑
j
W (j|i)q(i) log Φ(i|j)
q(i)
, (17)
the leakage of the corresponding iteration is computed as:
λ(`+ 1) = J(ql+1,Φ`), (18)
The iteration will terminate when |λ(`+1)−λ(`)| < δ. The process is shown in Algorithm 2.
It is noteworthy that the Blahut–Arimoto algorithm can only be applied to discrete data.
Hence, a quantization is applied to transform the continuous matching score into discrete
score by dividing the scores into small bins with width of 0.01, then calculate the ML based
on Blahut–Arimoto algorithm.
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Algorithm 2: Max leakage quantification based on the Blahut–Arimoto algorithm
INPUT: W (j|i) of a given cancelable biometric system
OUTPUT: Max leakage λmax
Initiate q0 with uniform distribution, iteration index ` = 0 compute λ(0); Define
precision parameter δ;
repeat
Compute q(`+1) according to (16);
Compute Φ`(i|j) according to (15);
Compute λ(`+ 1) according to (18);
` = `+ 1;
until |λ(`+ 1)− λ(`)| < δ;
λmax = λ(`+ 1);
5. Experiments and results
In this section, we first validate the proposed similarity-based attack with several state-
of-art cancelable biometric schemes. We launch the attack with single and multiple com-
promised templates to verify Corollary 1, i.e., more compromised instances lead to more
information leakage. Then the leakage and the security level of considered state-of-art can-
celable biometrics are evaluated.
To explore the capability of similarity-based attack on BioHashing, IoM hashing, and
MDSH, face dataset LFW [32] is utilized to compute the score distribution under different
simulations. In LFW, the identity which has more than 10 images are selected, and the first
10 images are chosen to form a new subset denoted as LFW10 (158 users). The face feature
of LFW10 is extracted by a deep learning model, namely InsightFace (a.k.a ArcFace) [33].
To explore the capability of similarity-based attack for Bloom-Filter, the left eye images in
the CASIA-v4-Iris-Interval1 are utilized to generate the IrisCode [34] with Libor Masek’s
method [35]. Furthermore, fingerprint dataset FVC2002 DB2-A [36] is utilized for 2PMCC.
The default parameters of MCC SDK2 are adopted, i.e. R = 75, NS = 16, and ND = 5.
To initiate GA, the population size in GA is set as 200 individuals, and the crossover
fraction is set to 0.9, while the mutation ratio is set to 0.01. In this experiment, each user’s
feature vector is reconstructed based on the various number of compromised templates in
Sys C, and then the reconstructed feature is utilized to generate the template with the
transformation function in Sys T . Finally, the newly generated template is matched with
the real template in Sys T to generate the mated-imposter score, where the false accept
rate at the EER threshold (FAR@ET) is calculated. Here, higher FAR@ET implies that the
scheme is more vulnerable to attack and vice versa. The setup of each cancelable biometric
scheme is listed in Table 2.
1http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/china/Iris Databases CH.asp
2biolab.csr.unibo.it/mccsdk.html
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Table 2: Cancelable biometric schemes setup.
Method Dataset Biometric trait Feature size CB template size
BioHashing
LFW
Deep
facial feature
512 real-valued
vector
16-500 bits
Spectral hashing 10-256 bits
IoM hashing 16-500 bits
Bloom-Filter
Casia-V4
Interval
IrisCode 10240 bits 26 ∗ 2{8,9,10} bits
2PMCC
FVC2002
DB2
Fingerprint
MCC16
16*16*5 real-valued
number for each
minutiae point
k =
16, 32, 64, 128 bits
Table 3: Similarity-based attack evaluation on BioHashing (%).
Normal Attack
l θ EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
16 0.56 19.95 24.12 28.28 4.16
32 0.59 12.76 12.48 14.22 1.74
64 0.59 7.80 7.11 11.35 4.24
100 0.58 6.56 6.81 14.33 7.52
200 0.57 5.49 5.43 28.78 23.35
300 0.56 5.34 5.18 51.62 46.44
400 0.56 5.48 5.57 72.20 66.63
500 0.56 5.29 5.22 85.54 80.32
5.1. Attack on Biohashing
The effectiveness of similarity-based attack on BioHashing template f(x) with different
bit size l is first evaluated. The EER and FAR of BioHashing system under normal situation
are collected. The system threshold θ is computed and fixed with respect to the EER. Next,
the similarity-based attack is launched with the compromised template from Sys C. The
generated f(xˆ) is matched with f(x) in Sys T to generate the mated-imposter scores .
The genuine and imposter scores are generated by matching templates from the same user
and different user under normal situation (See Fig. 6). The attack false accept rate at normal
system threshold θ in Sys C is computed, and ∆FAR = FARattack@ET − FARnormal@ET
is also reported. (see Table 3).
Under normal situation, as the length of BioHash code becomes longer, the accuracy per-
formance in terms of EER and FAR@ET becomes better (See normal column in Table 3).
However, the risk from a similarity-based attack shows a different result. A longer BioHash
code will lead to poor FAR@ET (See attack column in Table 3). This is within our expecta-
tion, while longer BioHash code suggests the presence of more information, thus leading to
better accuracy performance. However, more information implies lower attack complexity.
On the other hand, smaller l may achieve stronger resistance to the similarity-based
attack but will lead to a higher risk of false accept attack (see section 26.6.1.1 in [37]), which
can break the system by exploiting authentication attempt without knowing the algorithm.
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(a) Hypothesis (b) BioHashing (l = 500)
Figure 6: Similarity-based attack can shift the score distribution. Genuine/imposter is the matching score
from same/different user under normal situation, mated-imposter is the matching score between the attacker’s
preimage and template in the system. The Mated-imposter is shifted to the right side, hence some of the
scores can exceed the rejection threshold.
In the scenario of a false-accept attack, assuming that the attacker can access a sufficient
number of transformed template, then the attacker may try to pass the authentication by
simulating authentication attempts. The success rate of the attack depends on FAR of the
system, which means 1
FAR
authentication attempts can be expected to break the system. As
the result suggests short length of hash code is accompanied with higher false accept rate,
the best performance achieved is 5.22% of FAR@ET with 500 bits of hash code. The overall
results suggest that both long and short BioHash code are not recommended.
By observing the matching score distribution, it is expected that the risk is originated
from the threshold-based decision scheme in the biometric verification system. The attack
is anticipated to shift the distribution of the mated-imposter scores to the right side (see
Fig. 6(a)), hence achieve high FAR. To prove the score shifting hypothesis, the genuine,
imposter, and mated-imposter score distributions with l = 500 are plotted in Fig. 6(b). It
is clear that the attack can lead to a large shifting of the mated-imposter distribution, and
hence leads to more matching instances that exceed the threshold.
In reality, it is highly possible that the attacker can break more than one system. Hence,
we consider a case that allows the attacker to initiate the attack with multiple compromised
templates. For each user, multiple compromised templates ranging from 1 to 5 in Sys C are
selected to launch the attack.
Intuitively, multiple instances of compromised template provide more information for the
attack to construct a better preimage, and therefore, our result in Table 4 does support our
hypothesis. To be specific, FAR@ET increases from 80% to 95% when the compromised
templates increase from 1 to 5.
As discussed in section 4, we measure λmax, i.e., max leakage, from the distance correla-
tion of a given cancelable biometric function against bit length l to explore their relationship.
From Fig. 7(a), the leakage and accuracy performance will increase w.r.t l. This shows
that good accuracy does not imply good security.
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Table 4: Similarity-based attack evaluation on Biohashing with multiple compromised template with l = 500
(%).
Normal Attack
# of templates
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
1
5.21
80.25 75.04
2 91.14 85.93
3 94.30 89.09
4 95.95 90.74
5 94.37 89.15
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(c) IoM Hashing
Figure 7: Max leakage and accuracy performance against l. The information leakage and accuracy is inversely
correlated to l.
5.2. Attack on non-linear multi-dimensional spectral hashing
The NMDSH consists of spectral hashing and a “softmod” function inspired from [28].
The EER and FAR are evaluated for NMDSH based on the same protocol applied for eval-
uating BioHashing, except we set α = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} in (3). Finally, FAR@ET and
∆FAR are reported (Table 5 and Table 6).
The result of NMDSH shows similar trend as that of BioHashing, i.e., longer hash code
causes more severe information leakage (Table 5). As l increases from 10 to 256, ∆ FAR
increases significantly from 1.35 to 63.7. This is reasonable because longer hash code is
supposed to capture more information. However, if higher accuracy is required, then l
should be longer, hence leading to a contradiction with the information leakage.
The attack performance under different distortion rate α is performed, as shown in Ta-
ble 6. It is observed that stronger distortion can decrease the attack performance as ∆ FAR
drops from 63.7 to 3.47 when α increase from 0.1 to 0.9. However, the accuracy deteriorates
when α is increased, but this does not mean we have less information leakage, the max
leakage remains high, as shown In Table 6 (see column with label λmax).
More instances of the compromised template are proven to be able to increase the attack
performance, as shown in Table 7. FAR@ET increases from 23.27 to 32.71 when the number
of compromised template increases from 1 to 4.
The results, which include λmax and EER of NMDSH, are shown in Fig. 7(b). The
leakage and accuracy performance show similar characteristics to that of Biohashing, and it
is consistent with the results obtained for the above attack experiments.
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Table 5: Similarity-based attack evaluation on NMDSH under different l (%).
Normal Attack
α l θ EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
0.10 10 0.60 22.02 17.80 19.15 1.35
0.10 50 0.60 8.15 11.68 16.33 4.65
0.10 128 0.58 5.70 5.60 22.28 16.68
0.10 256 0.56 5.43 5.41 69.11 63.7
Table 6: Similarity-based attack evaluation on NMDSH under different α (%).
Normal Attack
λmax
α l θ EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
0.10 256 0.56 5.43 5.41 69.11 63.7 3.43
0.30 256 0.56 5.41 5.36 65.44 60.08 3.53
0.50 256 0.55 6.35 6.35 33.42 27.07 3.63
0.70 256 0.53 17.33 17.80 20.06 2.98 3.59
0.90 256 0.52 24.93 24.50 27.97 3.47 3.59
5.3. Attack on IoM hashing
The IoM hashing is quite different from BioHashing and spectral hashing, and its core
idea is to project the feature vectors into a subspace by ranking. As for IoM hashing, we
also perform the evaluation based on the same protocol as we did for BioHashing. In our
experiment, the parameter q of IoM hashing is fixed at 16, while l ranges from 16 to 500.
As shown in Table 8, IoM hashing also shows similar characteristic as the results observed
for BioHashing and NMDSH. Specifically, when l increases, FAR under attack will increase
significantly. The simulation result for multiple compromised template in Table 4 suggest
that the availability of more compromised instances will lead to higher risks.
The results for max leakage λmax and EER of IoM hashing are shown in Fig. 7(c). The
leakage and accuracy performance also show similar characteristics to that of Biohashing
and NMDSH.
Table 7: Similarity-based attack evaluation on NMDSH with multiple compromised template with l = 500
(%).
Normal Attack
# of templates
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
1
5.69
23.27 17.58
2 24.99 24.99
3 30.30 30.30
4 32.71 32.71
5 30.81 30.81
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Table 8: Similarity-based attack evaluation on IoM hashing(%).
Normal Attack
l θ EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
16 0 22.67 23.88 22.94 -0.94
32 0.13 16.37 9.64 10.44 0.8
64 0.13 10.74 9.5 11.8 2.3
100 0.12 8.64 9.27 14.37 5.1
200 0.12 6.49 6.76 16.33 9.57
300 0.12 5.59 5.3 20.04 14.74
400 0.12 5.55 5.4 29.06 23.66
500 0.11 5.57 5.66 41.01 35.35
Table 9: Similarity-based attack evaluation on IoM hashing with multiple compromised template (%).
Normal Attack
# of templates
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
1
5.57
34.43 28.86
2 52.34 46.77
3 55.32 49.74
4 58.54 52.97
5 62.66 57.09
5.4. Attack on Bloom-Filter
In this paper, the Bloom-filter is implemented as described in [11] without using the
parameter, since we focus on irreversibility rather than revocability. We follow the settings
in [11], where we first shift the IrisCode by β bits, for β = −8,−7, · · · , 7, 8. The highest
matching score will be taken among those shifts to calculate the EER. In our experiment,
the EER is 3.46% for no shifting scenario, 21.6% for shifting scenario. Bloom-filter has two
parameters, i.e., word size ω and block size l. In this work, we fix the block size at 26, and the
word size ranges from 8 to 10 bits. We also perform the attack under multiple compromised
templates. The results are reported in Table 10. Under a single compromised template, the
results suggest that the attack can improve the FAR@ET for ω=8 and ω=9. When ω = 10,
it is hard to achieve a good attack performance. However, for the 3 compromised templates
situation, the attack performance can be significantly improved.
The results of λmax also agree with that of FAR@ET under the similarity-based attack
scenario. As recorded in Table 10, the leakage decreases from 3.03 to 2.91 as ω increases
from 8 to 10, which corresponds to the drop of attack FAR@ET from 74.21 to 42.88.
5.5. Cross-transform attack for face features
The aforementioned experiment is conducted on a specific transformation function, while
in reality, different systems may use different transformation function. In this section, we
assume a more complicated situation where the transformation function in Sys C (e.g.,
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Table 10: Similarity-based attack evaluation on Bloom-filter with block size 26 (%).
Normal
Attack with
single template
Attack with
3 templates λmax
ω θ EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR FAR ∆ FAR
8 0.27 14.07 13.99 38.03 24.04 74.21 60.22 3.03
9 0.19 13.88 14.05 17.32 3.27 52.27 38.22 2.83
10 0.14 14.22 14.19 13.86 -0.33 42.88 28.69 2.91
Table 11: The FAR@ET (%) under cross-transform attack (l = 500).
Compromised Sys C
Biohashing IoM hashing NMDSH0.5
Target Sys T
Biohashing 84.05 32.96 8.39
IoM hashing 43.87 24.53 8.54
NMDSH0.5 32.33 20.37 23.27
Table 12: The FAR@ET (%) of NMDSH with various α under cross-transform attack.
α MDSH IoM hashing BioHashing
0.1 70.06 19.56 29.24
0.3 66.71 18.80 31.84
0.5 28.92 7.72 14.24
0.7 19.94 4.18 1.96
0.9 26.52 3.16 1.77
BioHashing) is different from that of Sys T (e.g., IoM hashing). Again, we also assume
that the attacker knows the parameters and the transformation function. We denote this
attack scenario as cross-transform attack. We would like to address the question - “Can the
attacker gain access to the Sys T under the cross-transform attack situation?”
Table 11 tabulates FAR of the mated-imposter under cross-transform attack. Result
suggests that, even when Sys C and Sys T use different transformation functions, it is still
possible to attain a large FAR, which leads to high security risk for the system.
However, we found that NMDSH shows better resistance against the attack when α is
set to 0.5 (see Table 11). Next, the cross-transform attack performance with different α
is tested when the NMDSH system is utilized in Sys C. Again, the results in Table 12
suggest that weak non-linearity can lead to better attack performance as the IoM hashing
and BioHashing achieved good performance for α = 0.1 and 0.2.
5.6. Attack on 2PMCC
There are two parameters in 2PMCC, namely, k for KL-transform and c for the dimension
reduction. In our experiment, for simplicity, we assume c = k, which indicates no dimension
reduction in 2PMCC, and k ∈ {16, 32, 64, 128}. We also assume the secret s in 2PMCC is set
to an identical global parameter, which corresponds to the worse case of stolen parameter. In
this work, an open-source minutiae extractor, FingerJetFX OSE [38] is utilized to extract ISO
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Table 13: Similarity-based attack evaluation on 2PMCC (%).
Normal Attack
λmax
k, c
Threshold
θ
EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
16 0.86 15.16 15.39 40.50 25.11 3.02
32 0.77 6.74 7.05 32.00 24.95 2.88
64 0.70 3.11 3.09 28.37 25.28 2.62
128 0.65 2.05 1.93 25.62 23.69 2.61
minutiae templates for all fingerprints. FVC2002 DB2-A is utilized for simulation. FVC2002
DB2-A consists of 100 users with 8 samples per user. The original accuracy performance in
the form of EER is calculated with the official protocol3.
For the similarity-based attack on fingerprints, we set the generated fingerprint image to
a square with width and height of 350 with 50 minutiae points because the fingerprints in
FVC2002 DB2-A have an average of 52 minutiae points. Under similarity-based attack, the
first fingerprint template of each user is utilized as the compromised template to reconstruct
the original minutiae points. For the scenario of multiple compromised templates, extra
two or four templates are utilized to imitate the attack. The reconstructed fingerprint
minutiae points are utilized to generate 2PMCC template with the secret in the target
system, then, the generated template is matched with their corresponding target templates.
Hence 8 × 100 = 800 matching scores are collected. The FAR@ET is computed based on
those scores.
Table 13 tabulates the attack performance on 2PMCC under one compromising template
for different k and c. It is evidenced that the attack can achieve 25.6% for k = c = 128,
and the original EER=2.05%. We find that FAR@ET under similarity-based attack does
not increase w.r.t k and c. However, ∆FAR remains stable. In Fig. 8, the original and
reconstructed minutiae points are displayed. It can be seen that the reconstructed minutiae
points do not need to match with the original minutiae points to generate a 2PMCC template
close to the original one. In Table 13 we can also find that the max leakage decreases as
the k, c increases. This is consistent with the FAR@ET under similarity-based attack and
proves that the proposed measurement of leakage is reasonable.
The attack under multiple compromised templates is shown in Table 14. Similar to the
aforementioned cancelable biometrics, results suggest that multiple compromised templates
can help to achieve better performance. FAR@ET increases from 28.87% to 77.75% when
number of template increases from 1 to 5.
5.7. Time cost of the attack
The time cost for the attack depends mainly on the execution time of the cancelable
biometirc algorithm, the size of the feature, the population size and the max generations of
GA. Figure 9 indicates that BioHashing, NMDSH, IoM hashing and 2PMCC can converge
within 100 generations, while Fig. 10 suggests that Bloom Filter can converge around 1000
3http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002/protocol.asp
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Table 14: Similarity-based attack evaluation on 2PMCC with multiple compromised templates with k = c =
64 (%).
Normal Attack
# of templates
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET
∆ FAR
1
3.13
28.87 25.74
3 56.5 53.37
5 77.75 74.62
(a) Original (b) Reconstructed
Figure 8: Reconstructed fingerprint minutiae points of the 100-th user in FVC2002 DB2-A. The approximated
minutiae points do not necessarily match with the original minutiae points, but the generated 2PMCC
templates can be matched together.
Table 15: Time cost of the attack for different CB schemes.
Max
generations
l
CB
execution time
Overall
attack time
BioHashing
100
500 0.000024s 17s
IoM hashing 500 0.00018s 14s
NMDSH 256 0.041s 13mins
2PMCC 64 0.0025s 21mins
BloomFilter 1500 26 ∗ 28 0.0026s 33mins
generations. Table 15 tabulates the specific details of GA and overall time cost for one
template. The result suggests that the time mainly depends on the execution time of hashing
process. However, it is safe to conclude that similarity-based attack is time efficient in real
life.
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Figure 9: The objective value against generations. The attack on BioHahing, IoM hashing, NMDSH and
2PMCC can converge at around 100 generations with population size of 200.
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Figure 10: The objective value against generations on Bloom-Filter.
Table 16: Summary of the attack on different cancelable schemes.
Features CB schems
Original
EER
Attack
FAR@ET
Time cost
Face
InsightFace
deep features
on LFW10
BioHashing
(l = 500)
5.29% 85.54% 17s
IoM hashing
(l = 500)
5.57% 41.01% 14s
NMDSH
(α = 0.1, l = 250)
5.43% 69.11% 13mins
Fingerprint
MCC on
minutiae points
k, c = 64
on FVC2002
DB2
2PMCC
(k = c = 64)
3.11% 28.37% 21mins
Iris
IrisCode on
Casia-V4-Interval
BloomFilter
(l = 26, ω = 8)
14% 38.03% 33mins
6. Discussion
6.1. The trade-off between security and accuracy
Table 16 provides a summary of the attack performance on different cancelable biometric
schemes. From the result, we can conclude that most cancelable schemes suffer from the
problem of information leakage. It is also worth to highlight that the attack can also achieve
good performance under cross-transform situation with the same feature extractor.
The success of the similarity-based attack is attributed to the information leakage of can-
celable biometrics, i.e., from the matcher module in Fig. 1. By incorporating Blahut–Arimoto
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Figure 11: The relationship between security risk and accuracy. Good matching accuracy is accompanied
with more information leakage and higher risk, while low matching accuracy does not mean lower risk due
to the false accept attack.
algorithm, we propose a framework of measuring the information leakage from the distance
preserving property of cancelable biometrics. Our quantification result also provides evidence
that the proposed attack can break the security of cancelable biometric schemes whose in-
formation leakage can be attributed to its distance correlation.
While most cancelable biometric schemes show good accuracy performance, the analysis
and result in our work suggests otherwise. Specifically, our results show that higher accuracy
may lead to severe security breach, and also note that lower accuracy does not necessarily
imply better security. The security level of a given system should consider multiple factors,
such as the false accept rate and the information leakage via single and multiple compromised
templates.
With the above discussion, we can anticipate that there exists a trade-off of information
leakage and accuracy, as illustrated in Fig. 11. Under low accuracy situation, the high FAR
will lead to a high vulnerability of false accept attack, while under high accuracy situation,
there will be more information leakage, hence leading to higher risk. Therefore, one should
be mindful of these relationships and properties when deploying a cancelable biometrics for
actual application..
6.2. Possible solutions for the similarity-based attack
One possible solution is storing the template in a trusted third entity, while the encryption
and matching take place inside the entity, and only the accept/reject response is returned
to the client, hence minimizing information leakage. Considering the GA in the attack,
another solution is to limit the number of attempts from one user (can be a normal user or
an attacker) in a system, hence the attack can not be launched. From the perspective of the
attack assumption, if the parameters of the transformation function is stored securely, the
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attack would also be less likely to succeed. In fact, parameters can be kept secured by using
some additional protection mechanisms such as suggested in [39] and [40].
7. Conclusion
In this work, we present a similarity-based attack on cancelable biometrics based on its
distance preserving characteristic. The similarity-based attack can reconstruct the feature
vector (preimage) by utilizing a searching algorithm, e.g., genetic algorithm. The preimage
does not need to resemble the original feature vector but can be utilized to generate a tem-
plate which can match with the real template in the system after transformation. To validate
this attack model, several cancelable biometric schemes are assessed in our experiment, and
each exhibits a high risk of being compromised under this attack.
Due to the distance preserving property, the cancelable biometric suffers unavoidably
from the information leakage. Hence, there is still a big gap between security and accuracy.
The secured cancelable biometric systems still deserve further research. In addition, the
information leakage quantification in our work only focuses on the distance correlation prop-
erty, which is a relaxed form of the original problem. Hence a framework which can quantify
the information leakage directly from the biometric feature and template is urgently needed
to overcome the drawback of this work.
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